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COLLOQUIUM 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AN ERA 
OF CONTRACTING CIVIL LIABILITY 
FOREWORD 
Benjamin C. Zipursky* 
 
On October 27, 2017, the Stein Center for Law and Ethics in conjunction 
with the Fordham Law Review hosted a Colloquium entitled Access to Justice 
and the Legal Profession in an Era of Contracting Civil Liability.  This issue 
of the Fordham Law Review publishes the articles prepared for that 
Colloquium.  Traversing tort reform, constitutional rights, federal courts, 
civil procedure, and legal ethics, the small Colloquium was cross-disciplinary 
with a vengeance.  Happily, these contributions from scholars around the 
country have now coalesced into a coherent whole. 
Although the Colloquium topic is not part of the access-to-justice 
movement as usually defined, it makes sense to say a few words in advance 
about access to justice because contracting civil liability is a complementary 
theme and, indeed, because the National Center for Access to Justice has 
recently joined Fordham Law School (and thus provided further impetus for 
exploring this critically important area).1  For the most art, the access-to-
justice movement identifies the formal and informal barriers ordinary people 
must surmount in order to enforce their rights effectively and to be duly 
protected from civil and criminal liability.2  Lawyers, funding, information, 
evidence, physical access, legal aid asymmetries in representation—these are 
only the beginnings of the host of challenges most individuals face, barriers 
that have an especially marked impact for the poorest in our society.  As 
substantive legal rights, powers, and protections expanded in the 1960s and 
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1970s, profound limitations in the means to access to those rights became 
even clearer.  To its enormous credit, the access-to-justice movement has 
begun to mobilize lawyers and judges.  There is an increasing recognition 
that our special privileges as members of the bar and bench come with a 
responsibility to see to it that the legal system is serving society’s members 
tolerably well and to repair it where it is broken.  It is therefore both 
appropriate and, now, unsurprising to see access-to-justice concerns as part 
of the academic field of professional responsibility and legal ethics. 
As Professor David Marcus’s superb history of the federal class action 
displays, the spirit of proactive litigation expansion in the 1950s through the 
1970s3 was largely supplanted in the 1980s and 1990s (and into the present 
day) by an opposite set of forces—forces of contraction.4  Professor Marcus’s 
account of the transition from the period of expansion to the period of 
contraction was part of this Colloquium and was published as a freestanding 
article in the March 2018 issue of the Fordham Law Review.5 
The contraction of civil liability is connected with, but in at least one 
respect more disturbing than, the diminution in access to justice; it arguably 
marks a decline in our enthusiasm for justice itself.  It would be one thing if 
our legal system’s proclivity to restrain and punish individuals were cut back.  
Alas, that is not the case.  Our Colloquium participants here suggest an 
asymmetry in the direction of legal change; there is a marked diminution of 
legal powers of the relatively powerless to hold the powerful accountable for 
violations of the law.  While academic literature on access-to-justice contains 
much that relates to professional responsibility and legal ethics, professional 
responsibility and legal ethics have not figured prominently in the academic 
literature on contracting civil liability.  Yet the fact that civil liability is 
contracting is surely a proper topic of concern for the bench and the bar, just 
like access to justice more conventionally understood.  We are not talking 
about substantive rights and protections—we are talking about whether those 
who would wish to exercise and vindicate those rights will, as a practical 
matter, be able to do so. 
Professor Maria Glover’s “‘Encroachments and Oppressions’:  The 
Corporatization of Procedure and the Decline of Rule of Law” begins our 
issue with a devastating overview of the procedural changes in federal law 
that have dramatically strengthened the hand of corporate America in civil 
litigation—heightening of pleading standards, restrictions on class actions, 
and shearing away of personal jurisdiction are principal examples of a much 
broader phenomenon.6 
If Professor Glover’s article provides the grand overview at a federal level, 
Professor Nora Freeman Engstrom’s “The Diminished Trial” brings us right 
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down to earth at the level of the particular case and the particular trial.  While 
several scholars in recent years have documented the extraordinary 
diminution in the number of civil trials that occur, both in federal and state 
courts, Professor Engstrom shows that the trials themselves have become 
much shorter and heavily constricted.7  The point is that today’s judiciary 
employs more than great pressure to settle, which creates grounds for worry 
that a civil plaintiff will effectively be shut down in his or her effort to hold 
a defendant accountable.  Even if there is a trial, it will be very possibly 
structured in a manner that squeezes out the plaintiff’s power and diminishes 
the procedures set forth to ensure a fair trial.8 
Three of those participating in the Colloquium—Professor Jules Lobel, 
Professor Alexander Reinert, and I—took the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 
2017 decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi9 as a (regrettable) occasion to mark the 
atrophy of federal civil rights actions flowing from Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.10  Fordham Law School was 
fortunate to have, in Professors Lobel and Reinert, two of the lawyers 
intimately involved in the post-9/11 Bivens litigation, including Ziglar and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.11  The plaintiffs in Ziglar were (primarily) Muslim men 
wrongfully imprisoned pursuant to explicit religious and ethnic profiling 
after 9/11.12  Professor Lobel explains in “Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Demise 
of Accountability” how anomalous the Supreme Court’s denial of a Bivens 
claim was in Ziglar.13  This is so especially in light of the Court’s quite 
activist stance in the post-9/11 case Boumediene v. Bush.14  While Professor 
Lobel’s article emphasizes the role Bivens actions have played in public 
accountability, my own short contribution—“Ziglar v. Abbasi and the 
Decline of the Right to Redress”—ties Justice Kennedy’s constricted view of 
Bivens to a range of other developments that display our legal system’s 
diminishing respect for the principle ubi jus, ibi remedium:  where there’s a 
right there’s a remedy.15 
In a remarkably thoughtful article also stemming in part from Ziglar—
“The Influence of Government Defenders on Affirmative Civil Rights 
Enforcement”—Professor Reinert discusses the twin roles of the federal 
government in civil rights litigation (sometimes plaintiff/civil rights enforcer, 
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sometimes defendant/government-actor protector).16  Notwithstanding the 
common assumption of a left/right divide on civil rights at the Supreme 
Court, Professor Reinert notes that the Obama administration’s lawyers at the 
Supreme Court were even more aggressive in rejecting accountability than 
their Bush administration predecessors.17 
In a welcome turn, several of our participants painted a more mixed 
picture, or at least suggested strategies for protecting the powerless in an era 
of contracting liability.  Professor Michael L. Wells’s “Wrongful 
Convictions, Constitutional Remedies, and Nelson v. Colorado” focuses on 
a case in which a majority of the Justices held unconstitutional a Colorado 
law concerning funds that a criminal defendant had been required to pay the 
state after being convicted.18  Colorado law permitted the state to retain these 
funds even after a defendant’s conviction was overturned and the defendant 
was exonerated.  Although Professor Wells’s own central point was to 
indicate today’s unfortunately muddled “property” jurisprudence under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, he saw another path to the same decision, and in any 
event showed that the 2017 Court was still willing to enforce fundamental 
rule-of-law values in a case involving an especially vulnerable litigant.19 
In “The Politics of Access: Examining Concerted State/Private 
Enforcement Solutions to Class Action Bans,” Professor Myriam Gilles 
explores the politics of regaining citizens’ rights to aggregate litigation in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,20 which broadly endorsed class-ban provisions.21  Once class 
actions are off the table for violations of state consumer rights statutes, 
liability is unlikely because of the low stakes.  In a sweeping yet incisive 
survey, Professor Gilles suggests that state parens patriae, private attorney 
general qui tam statutes, and state attorney general proceedings with 
collateral estoppel effect would leverage the standing of public officials to 
escape the harmful effects of Concepcion.22 
The integrity of the trial process has ardent defenders in Professors Suja 
Thomas and Jeffrey Stempel.  Professor Thomas’s “Reforming the Summary 
Judgment Problem: The Consensus Requirement” provides a powerful 
critique of judicial trends to circumvent the jury trial, including the 
aggressive granting of summary judgment motions.23  Constructively 
commenting on what has been a controversial issue since the Supreme 
Court’s Celotex trilogy decades ago, Professor Thomas provocatively 
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proposes that federal appellate panels not permit summary judgment without 
panel unanimity.24 
A similarly constructive proposal is presented by Professor Stempel in his 
article “Judicial Peremptory Challenges as Access Enhancers.”25  Alert to the 
possibility of trial judges whom litigants would plausibly view as shutting 
down their prospects at the outset of litigation, Professor Stempel suggests 
that each litigant be permitted one peremptory challenge of an assigned trial 
judge.26  Far from being a novelty, judicial peremptory challenges have been 
in place in seventeen states for the past several decades, he notes.27  Professor 
Stempel provides an array of reasons for thinking that a much broader range 
of states would benefit by introduction of this procedure. 
Finally, and by way of acknowledging the necessity of challenging our 
own dogmas, the Colloquium concludes with Professor Rebecca Aviel’s fine 
article acknowledging the real benefits of litigation reform to those seeking 
access to some important parts of our legal system.28  In “Family Law and 
the New Access to Justice,” Professor Aviel documents the substantial value 
that litigation reform has provided in the family law context.  It is not just 
that cost, time, and judicial resources have often been spared—justice, 
access, and desirable outcomes for litigants’ lives have often benefited from 
relaxation of some traditional aspects of the legal process.29  Her article 
reminds us that the fact of legal reform itself is hardly the problem.  The 
question—a question this Colloquium addresses in a time of much legal 
turmoil—is how to engage in legal reform that enhances rather than constricts 
litigants’ access to justice. 
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